PUBLICATIONS  OF 


American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 
No.  113. 

IDEA  OF  JUSTICE 

IN 

POLITICAL  ECONOMY. 


BY 


Prof.  Gustav  Schmoller, 

University  of  Berlin. 


A PAPER  SUBMITTED  TO  THE 
AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 


PHILADELPHIA : 


AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE. 


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France  : L.  Larose,  rue  Soufflot  22,  Paris.  Germany  : Gustav  Fischer,  Jer  a* 
Italy:  Direzione  del  Giornale  degli  Economist!,  Rome,  via  Ripetta  102.  ' 
Spain  : Fuentes  y Capdeville,  Madrid,  9 Plaza  de  Santa  Ana, 


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S IDEA  OF  JUSTICE 

IN 

POLITICAL  ECONOMY.* 


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is there  a just  distribution  of  economic  goods?  Or  should 
there  be  ? This  is  a question  which  is  raised  again  to-day,  a 
question  which  has  been  asked  as  long  as  human  society  and 
social  institutions  have  existed.  The  greatest  thinker  of 
ancient  history  asked  the  question  and  thousands  after  him 
have  repeated  it,  sages  and  scholars,  great  statesmen  and 
hungry  proletarians,  thoughtful  philanthropists  and  enthu- 
siastic idealists. 

To-day  the  question  seems  less  opportune  than  ever.  Even 
those  who  pride  themselves  on  their  idealism  declare  it  to  be 
one  of  the  useless  questions  which  nobody  can  answer. 

Aristotle’s  ideas  of  distributive  justice  are  looked  down 
upon  as  antiquated  and  set  aside  by  the  progress  of  science. 
Comparing  superficially  the  phenomena  of  nature  with  the 

[*  This  paper  was  first  printed  in  Schmoller’s  Jahrbuch  fur  Gesetzgebung , Ver- 
waltung , und  Volkswirthschaft  Vol.  I of  the  New  Series  1881.  As  it  expresses  the 
matured  views  of  the  leader  of  the  historical  school  in  Germany  upon  a most  im- 
portant topic,  it  seemed  worth  while  to  present  it  in  an  English  dress.  Editors.) 

[697] 


2 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


social  processes,  Darwin’s  theory  of  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, which  permits  the  strong  to  oppress  the  weak  and 
excludes  all  possibility  of  a just  distribution  of  earthly  pos- 
sessions, is  brought  into  play.  Many  political  economists 
also  disregard  the  question,  the  more  so  the  further  they  are 
removed  from  philosophical  inquiries,  and  the  more  they 
delve  into  special  questions  remaining,  despite  many  conces- 
sions to  modern  schools,  in  their  fundamental  views  in  the 
beaten  paths  of  English  and  German  dogmas,  which  know 
no  other  categories  than  demand  and  supply.  They  have,  as 
a rule,  a vague,  half-conscious  feeling  that  socialism  demands 
a juster  distribution  of  goods,  and  hence  the  conservative 
citizen  and  friend  of  order  has  no  choice  but  to  oppose  this 
idea.  Those  who  harbor  such  thoughts  and  feelings  place 
themselves,  it  is  true,  in  the  sharpest  contrast  to  the  great 
founders  of  modern  social  science. 

No  one  was  ever  more  convinced  that  his  proposed  reforms 
would  effect  a more  just  or  indeed  an  absolutely  just  dis- 
tribution of  goods  than  Adam  Smith  or  Turgot,  or  their  sincere 
followers.  Faith  in  the  justice  of  its  demands  was  the  back- 
bone of  the  economics  of  natural  law.  As  a consequence  of 
“ natural  freedom  and  justice,”  Adam  Smith  requires  free- 
dom of  migration  and  trade.  To  the  greatest  disciple  of 
Adam  Smith,  for  thus  have  Ricardo’s  ideas  been  recently 
correctly  summarized,  free  individual  competition  appears  to  be 
truest  justice  to  all  laboring  humanity.  This  is  not  accidental. 
No  great  social  or  economic  reform  can  conquer  the  sluggish 
resistance  which  opposes  it  by  merely  showing  its  utility. 
Only  when  it  can  be  made  to  appear  that  what  is  demanded 
is  the  demand  of  justice,  does  it  inflame  and  move  the  masses. 
For  years  I have  watched  in  public  discussions  and  in  eco- 
nomic publications  when  and  where  the  question  of  justice  was 
drawn  into  economic  matters,  and  I have  found  that  invol- 
untarily it  occurs  almost  everywhere.  In  discussing  the  bank 
question,  the  opponent  of  unsecured  notes  declares  them  to 
be  an  injustice;  when  duties  are  proposed,  the  free-trader 

[698] 


Justice  in  Poeiticae  Economy.  3 

claims  first  that  they  are  unjust,  then  immoral,  and  only  in 
the  third  place  that  they  are  economically  harmful.  In  all 
discussions  about  the  change  in  the  German  customs  policy 
of  1878,  both  sides  tried  to  prove  that  what  the  opponent 
desired  especially  injured  the  working  man  and  the  small 
capitalist,  and  thus  affected  in  the  most  unjust  way  the  dis- 
tribution of  income  and  wealth.  A well-known  politician, 
who  declares  the  discussion  of  justice  in  the  distribution  of 
income  and  wealth  to  be  superfluous,  falls  into  the  same 
mistake  with  which  he  reproaches  his  opponents,  in  his 
polemic  against  Marx.  He  declares  the  present  distribution 
of  wealth  in  Germany  to  be  legitimate,  because  it  was  not 
the  possession  of  colonies,  not  the  work  of  slaves,  but  the 
honest  labor  of  German  citizens  which  created  this  wealth. 
He  thus  unconsciously  calls  attention  quite  correctly  to  the 
central  idea  which  to-day  governs  the  popular  mind  in  regard 
to  the  just  distribution  of  wealth.  A leading  speaker  of  the 
free-traders,  in  the  Reichstag,  said  that  to-day  the  naive 
advocacy  of  low  wages  dare  no  longer  venture  into  the 
light.  To-day  we  consider  conditions  economically  sound 
only  when  they  guarantee  to  each  participant  in  the  work  a 
just  participation  in  the  earnings.  And  he  adds:  “The 
economic  ideal  is  reached  when  the  greatest  production  and 
the  most  uniform  distribution  among  the  participants  of 
the  profits  earned  coincide.” 

Whether  a just  distribution  of  goods  exists  in  reality  or 
not,  a question  which  for  the  present  I will  leave  unan- 
swered, still  it  is  always  spoken  of,  there  is  a general  belief 
in  it;  this  belief  is  speculated  upon,  and  it  has  its  practical 
consequences. 

This  brings  us  to  the  correct  formulation  of  the  question 
with  which  we  must  begin.  We  would  not  from  any  prin- 
ciple whatsoever  logically  deduce  a formula  whose  strict 
application  would  at  all  times  produce  justice;  we  would 
simply  and  modestly  put  the  question,  How  does  it  happen 
that  economic  transactions  and  social  phenomena  so  often 

[699] 


4 


Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 


bring  forth  a favorable  or  adverse  criticism  which  asserts  that 
this  is  just,  that  unjust?  When  we  have  a correct  answer 
to  this,  then  it  will  be  easy  to  draw  further  conclusions  and 
to  decide  what  force,  weight  and  influence  this  approving  or 
disapproving  judgment  will  exercise  retroactively  on  the 
social  and  economic  phenomena. 

I. 

Even  he  who  reduces  all  human  impulses  and  actions  to 
the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  must  admit  that,  as  far  as 
we  know  human  nature,  there  are,  besides  lower  impulses, 
higher  intellectual,  aesthetic  and  moral  ones.  They  give  to 
life  those  ideal  aims,  from  them  grow  those  conceptions  which 
accompany  and  influence  all  human  life,  all  actions,  all  insti- 
tutions, as  ideal  visions  of  what  ought  to  be.  Should  we 
call  the  essence  of  what  ought  to  be,  the  abstract  Good,  the 
abstract  Just  would  be  part  of  it.  Justice  is  a human  virtue. 
It  has  been  called  the  virtue  of  virtues.  It  is  the  permanent 
habit  of  mankind  to  adapt  its  actions  to  the  ideas  which  we 
call  the  abstract  Just.  The  Just  per  se,  anything  absolutely 
just,  is  found  in  reality  as  little  and  as  seldonl  as  anything 
absolutely  good.  The  Just  is  always  an  ideal  conception,  to 
which  reality  may  approach,  but  which  it  will  never  attain; 
the  ethical  judgment  that  an  action  or  the  deeds  of  a man 
are  just  always  affirms  only  that  his  deeds  correspond  to  an 
ideal  conception,  and  one  single  action  may  perhaps  com- 
pletely do  this;  but  a man’s  whole  life,  society  as  a whole 
and  its  actions  can  only  approach  it.  What  kind  of  an 
action  do  we  call  just  ? The  word  is  used  in  different  senses. 
W e often  use  it  merely  to  indicate  that  the  individual  is  con- 
forming to  the  laws  of  the  whole,  that  his  actions  are  in 
accord  with  positive  law.  We  use  it  also  in  the  much  broader 
sense  to  describe  his  actions,  not  so  much  as  corresponding 
to  positive  law  as  to  its  ideals.  We  oppose  a right  that 
ought  to  be — as  the  just — to  the  positive  law,  judge  the  latter 

[700] 


Justice  in  Political  Economy. 


5 


by  the  former,  and  call  actual  law  unjust  in  so  far  as  it  does 
not  correspond  to  this  ideal.  The  conceptions  which  guide 
us  herein,  and  from  which  we  derive  our  idea  of  the  just,  are 
by  no  means  simple;  on  the  one  hand  the  peculiar  nature 
of  legal  prescriptions,  being  certain  formal  rules  of  social 
intercourse,  and  on  the  other  the  ideal  aims  of  social  life 
which  determine  the  material  contents  of  law,  combine  to 
create  this  ideal.  Conceptions  of  the  perfect  commonwealth 
and  of  the  perfect  individual  are  associated  in  it.  When  we 
speak  of  what  is  just  in  a narrower  sense,  when  we  use  the 
word  not  as  it  is  used  in  schools,  but  in  the  daily  usage  of 
common  speech,  we  consider  only  one  of  these  conceptions, 
or  better,  only  one  of  these  co-operating  spheres  of  con- 
ception. When  we  speak  of  a just  judge,  a just  punish- 
ment, or  just  institutions,  we  usually  conceive  of  a society, 
a number  of  people,  a comparison  of  them,  and  a fair  distri- 
bution of  good  and  of  bad,  of  that  which  causes  pain  and 
pleasure,  measured  by  uniform  objective  standards.  The 
specific  conception  of  justice,  the  one  which  principally  inter- 
ests us  here,  is  that  of  justice  in  distribution;  it  always 
presupposes  the  proportionality  of  two  opposite  quantities, 
one  of  human  beings  and  one  of  goods  which  are  to  be  dis- 
tributed. We  necessarily  classify  in  series,  according  to 
objective  characteristics,  every  multiplicity  of  persons  which 
appears  to  us  in  some  respect  as  a unity;  and  the  ideal  con- 
ception of  what  ought  to  be,  demands  the  distribution  of 
goods  and  evils  according  to  this  classification.  By  this 
standard  our  ideaT~aIway s~  measures  reality.  Our  moral 
judgment  is  always  active  in  estimating  the  actions  of  men, 
their  vices  as  well  as  their  virtues  and  their  achievements — 
that  is  in  comparing  and  classifying  them . Our  social  instinct 
is  ever  active  in  fixing  the  relation  of  the  individual  and  his 
doings  to  the  whole  of  the  community,  of  the  State  and  of 
humanity,  in  measuring  and  locating  them  accordingly. 
With  relentless  necessity  the  conviction  always  governs  us 
that  this  classification  must  determine  the  distribution  of 

[701] 


6 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


honors  and  political  influence,  of  position,  of  incomes  and  pun- 
ishments. The  similar  should  be  treated  alike,  the  dissimilar 
unlike.  It  is  a reciprocity  of  human  actions  which  we  demand. 
The  maintenance  of  reciprocity  appears  just,  its  disregard 
unjust.  In  an  unjust  proportion  one  part  obtains  too  much, 
the  other  too  little.  The  unjust  usurps  too  much  of  the  good 
to  be  distributed,  the  unjustly  suffering  receives  too  little. 

We  call  an  election  system  just  which  distributes  political 
influence  according  to  individual  ability  and  merit  in  state 
and  community.  We  call  a penal  code  just  which,  in  spite 
of  the  manifold  variety  of  misdemeanors  and  crimes,  in 
spite  of  the  seeming  incomparability  of  the  different  punish- 
ments, has  found  a uniformly  weighing  system  which  par- 
allels offences  and  punishments  in  accordance  with  public 
sentiment.  We  speak  of  a just  gradation  o£  salaries,  of  a 
justjprpmotion  of  officers  in  every  stock  company,  in  every 
railroad,  as  well  as  in  the  army,  and  in  the  hierarchy  of 
State  officials.  We  speak  of  a just  distribution  of  taxes,  of 
a just  gradation  of  wages,  of  just  profits,  of  a just  interest 
on  loans.  And  always  there  is  the  same  conception  in  the 
background:  men  are  grouped  and  classified  according  to 
certain  characteristics,  qualities,  deeds  and  accomplishments, 
descent  and  prosperity.  Burdens  and  advantages  should 
correspond  to  these  classes. 

The  profit  of  an  undertaking  is  said  to  be  justly  higher 
than  the  rate  of  interest,  because  a greater  risk  and  an 
indemnity  for  labor  are  therein  involved,  both  of  which  are 
foreign  to  interest.  Interest  on  capital  is  just  because  the 
lender  foregoes  a possible  profit  or  enjoyment,  because  the 
borrower  is  in  a much  worse  position  without  this  aid,  and 
because  for  the  service  of  the  one  a consideration  from  the 
other  seems  just.  The  high  earnings  of  the  well-known 
physician  or  lawyer  are  just,  such  is  Adam  Smith’s  argu- 
ment, because  of  the  large  number  who  go  to  great  expense 
in  their  studies;  many  have  very  small  incomes;  the  chosen, 
able  ones  are  thus  in  a manner  compensated  therefor. 

[702] 


Justice  in  Political  Economy. 


7 


Every  house- wife,  every  servant  girl,  daily  and  hourly 
thinks  this  price  and  that  unjust,  and  this  always  on  the 
ground  of  comparisons,  classifications  and  valuations.  Most 
important,  however,  is  the  judgment  of  the  justice  or  injus- 
tice of  the  condition  of  social  classes  in  general. 

Aristotle  calls  slavery  just  when  master  and  slave  are 
by  nature  as  different  as  soul  and  body,  as  governing  will 
and  external  instrument.  Then,  he  says,  it  is  a natural, 
intrinsically  justified  slavery;  the  external  legal  relation  of 
society  corresponds  to  human  nature. 

Exactly  the  same  can  be  said  of  all  social  gradations  and 
classifications.  We  feel  them  to  be  just  as  far  as  we  find 
them  in  accord  with  our  observations  of  similar  or  dissimilar 
qualities  of  the  classes  in  question.  The  public,  mind  has 
never,  apart  from  times  of  error  and  excitement,  begrudged 
honor,  riches  and  position  to  those  whose  actions,  whose 
abilities  correspondingly  excelled.  It  found  fault  with  the 
condition  of  the  middle  and  lower  classes  whenever  it  ob- 
served that  men  of  the  same  race,  the  same  creed,  the 
same  community,  were  maltreated  by  their  equals  and  were 
held  in  a subjection  not  corresponding  to  their  education 
and  merit.  All  class  struggles  of  the  past  have  arisen  from 
these  sentiments.  The  greatest  politicians  and  popular 
leaders  of  all  times,  as  well  as  the  greatest  kings  and  Caesars, 
placed  themselves  at  the  head  of  movements  which,  origin- 
ating in  oppressed,  abused  and  maltreated  classes,  aspired, 
successfully  or  otherwise,  to  a removal  of  unjust  social  con- 
ditions. These  class-struggles  have  often  been  only  for  polit- 
ical rights,  for  honors,  or  for  marriage  rights.  The  essen- 
tial element,  however,  was  always  an  economic  question,  the 
distribution  of  incomes  and  wealth  or  the  conditions  and 
avenues  to  them,  the  possibilities  of  acquisition;  for  in  the 
social  struggle  for  life,  economic  existence  is  the  most 
important  factor. 

And  therefore  the  question  always  arises  here  also, 
whether  that  which  is,  is  just.  Is  this  restriction  of  trade, 

[703] 


8 Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

this  or  that  institution  touching  the  distribution  of  wealth, 
is  this  entire  distribution  of  incomes  just  ? 

This  question,  indeed,  is  not  always  equally  emphasized; 
the  feelings  which  spring  from  the  answer  do  not  at  all 
times  equally  influence  the  masses  and  single  parties.  The 
judgment,  that  a certain  classification  and  distribution  of 
incomes  is  just  or  unjust,  is  of  course  not  the  only  one  that 
is  given  about  the  social  phenomenon  in  question.  Nor  is 
this  judgment,  even  though  thousands  are  agreed  upon  it, 
the  only  power  which  rules  the  distribution  of  incomes. 
But  this  judgment  is  the  only  psychological  basis  from 
which  all  demands  for  the  right  of  equality  have  arisen.  It  is 
the  basis  of  all  individualism.  From  the  standpoint  of  man- 
kind there  may  be  other  demands;  mankind  and  its  interests 
demand  sacrifices  in  the  upper  as  well  as  in  the  lower  ranks. 
The  practical  representatives  of  this  standpoint  in  political 
life  must,  therefore,  necessarily  seek  to  combat  or  to  weaken 
the  conclusions  resulting  from  this  fundamental  principle  of 
individualism.  And  from  their  standpoint  they  are  justified 
in  so  doing.  But  equally  justified  on  the  other  hand  is  the 
standpoint  of  individualism;  and  it  is  this  which  demands 
justice,  proportionality  of  duties  and  rights;  it  demands 
equality  for  equal,  inequality  for  unequal  men.  The  prin- 
ciple of  civil,  political  and  social  equality  will  never  have  a 
firm  foundation  unless  one  seeks  it  in  this  connection. 
Every  limitation  of  the  principle  of  equality,  other  than 
that  which  is  prompted  by  the  qualities  and  merits  of  men, 
is  arbitrary.  Material  justice  demands  equal  rights  only  in 
so  far  as  it  observes  equal  qualities,  as  it  presumes  the  possi- 
bility of  equal  achievement  and  fulfillment  of  duties. 

II. 

Thus  the  approving  or  disapproving  judgment  of  the  jus- 
tice of  human  actions  or  institutions  always  rests  on  the 
same  psychological  processes.  But  the  results  to  which  it 
comes  may  be  very  different.  How  would  it  otherwise  be 

[704] 


Justice  in  Political  Economy. 


9 


possible  that  the  conceptions  of  justice  of  barbarians,  of 
heathens,  of  Christians,  of  men  of  modern  culture,  differ  so 
much  that  something  different  is  always  demanded  under  the 
plea  of  justice?  Even  within  the  same  nation  and  the 
same  period  the  controversy  as  to  what  constitutes  justice 
will  never  cease;  but  from  time  to  time  certain  judgments 
will  succeed  in  placing  themselves  in  the  dominating  centre 
of  the  progressive  movement,  certain  results  of  former  in- 
tellectual contests  will  descend  to  posterity  as  a secured 
inheritance;  and  as  long  as  the  night  of  barbarism  does  not 
break  in  again  they  will  rule  and  influence  it  more  and 
more. 

If  we  now  try  to  explain  somewhat  more  fully  the  psycho- 
logical processes  in  question,  the  first  step  always  seems  to 
be  to  group  in  our  conceptions  a number  of  men  into  bodies 
of  moral  community.  These  bodies  are  then  compared  and 
tested  according  to  their  qualities  and  actions.  The  equali- 
ties are  searched  for  and  found  by  the  judgment,  the  in- 
equalities and  their  degrees  are  tried  by  the  estimating  and 
valuing  sense.  It  is  in  the  realm  of  the  feelings  in  which 
all  the  final  decisions  on  this  most  important  point  are 
reached.  All  feelings  finally  resolve  themselves  into  an 
adjudging  or  disparaging,  into  an  estimation  and  a sensation 
of  that  which  furthers  and  that  which  impedes  us;  they  are 
decisions  on  the  worth  of  men  and  things.  And  upon  this 
now  follows  finally  the  simple  logical  conclusion:  the  persons 
whom  I am  to  conceive  as  a moral  community  must,  as  far 
as  human  intervention  reaches,  be  treated  equally  in  the 
measure  of  their  equality,  unequally  in  the  measure  of  their 
inequality. 

The  groups  of  persons  into  which  our  conceptions  neces- 
sarily classify  mankind  are  manifold.  The  members  of  the 
family  and  the  tribe,  the  fellows  of  a society  and  a commu- 
nity, the  citizens  of  a State  and  of  a federation,  the  members 
of  a church  and  of  a race,  finally  all  humanity  in  a certain 
sense  can  be  so  grouped,  but  only  in  so  far  as  they  form 

[705] 


io  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

a moral  community  and  pursue  certain  common  ends.  Who- 
soever stands  without  the  group  is  foreign  to  the  comparison, 
is  not  comprised  in  the  judgment  of  what  is  just.  Hence  a 
barbarian  does  not  think  it  unjust  to  kill  the  stranger;  only 
the  conception  of  a moral  community  between  all  nations  and 
all  men  prevents  this.  Likewise  it  does  not  seem  to  me 
unjust  that  an  Englishman  pays  double  the  taxes  paid  by  a 
German  of  equal  income.  With  the  variety  of  different 
human  purposes  and  communities  the  same  man  appears  at 
one  time  like  his  fellows,  at  another  unlike.  In  a club  of 
any  kind  which  claims  but  a small  fraction  of  our  interest, 
we  see  no  injustice  in  a per  capita  assessment  which  we  would 
consider  unbearable  in  a State  or  community.  It  accords 
with  our  idea  of  justice  that  all  young  and  vigorous  men 
have  an  equal  duty  in  the  defence  of  our  country,  whereas 
for  other  public  and  social  purposes  they  show  the  greatest 
dissimilarities,  and  are  accordingly  treated  differently. 

The  judgment  of  equality  or  inequality  is,  therefore, 
always  a very  complicated  one.  Not  only  must  the  human 
qualities  and  deeds  be  considered  per  se,  but  also  in  their 
relations  to  the  aims  of  human  society.  In  one  grouping 
and  classification  we  have  in  view  only  some  one  certain 
well-defined  quality  of  mankind;  in  another  we  attempt  a 
weighing  of  all  qualities,  we  seek  the  average  human  being. 
A shipwrecked  party,  which  has  saved  itself  in  a boat  too 
small  to  carry  all,  will  be  apt  to  value  all  their  companions 
equally  in  the  question  of  life  and  death,  and  cast  lots 
equally  for  all.  But  the  provisions  which  have  been  saved 
will  be  distributed  according  to  the  various  needs,  i.  e .,  the 
seaman  at  the  oar  will  be  given  twice  as  much  as  the  three- 
year-old  child.  In  a tribe  of  warlike  nomads  the  bravest 
fighter,  in  the  jockey  club  the  best  rider,  is  fairly  given  a 
preference  which  would  appear  unjust  in  other  groups  of  men. 
Even  in  the  family  and  in  the  State  a certain  kind  only  of 
qualities  or  actions  often  forms  the  basis  of  judgment.  The 
judge  on  the  bench  cares  only  for  certain  wrongful  acts;  the 

[706] 


Justice:  in  Politic  at  Economy, 


it 


father  who  wishes  to  bequeath  the  same  to  each  child, 
because  he  thinks  this  just,  will  not  deny  their  dissimilarity 
in  many  respects.  The  State,  however,  will  distribute 
honors  and  dignities  in  the  nearest  possible  relation  to  the 
average  of  qualities  most  important  to  it.  Every  election, 
every  promotion  is  governed  by  an  average  of  composite 
impressions.  The  judgment  upon  a just  or  unjust  distri- 
bution of  wealth  and  income  will  always  rest  on  a similar 
basis. 

Whether  it  be  a single  quality  or  action,  or  a sum  of  them, 
those  which  are  considered  are  such  as  relate  to  the  aims 
and  ends  of  the  community.  And  they  may  naturally  be  of 
the  greatest  variety,  may  include,  for  instance,  even  physical 
strength  or  beauty.  In  an  athletic  club  it  seems  just  to 
give  a prize  to  the  strongest  man,  in  tableaux  vivants  to 
favor  a beautiful  woman.  As  a rule,  however,  in  social 
bodies  of  a higher  order  those  qualities  are  to  be  considered 
which,  like  virtue  and  talent,  are  of  the  greatest  service  to 
them,  which  manifest  themselves  in  actions  advantageous  to 
the  community.  Often  there  are  very  heterogeneous  quali- 
ties to  be  compared,  as  the  aims  of  the  great  moral  communi- 
ties, especially  of  the  State,  are  the  most  various.  The 
question  can  arise,  is  the  brave  general  or  the  great  states- 
man, the  great  painter  or  the  great  singer,  of  greater  uni- 
versal value  ? The  decision  is  given  by  public  sentiment 
according  to  that  classification  of  purposes  which  appears  at 
the  moment  to  be  the  correct  one,  and  following  it  we  find  a 
verdict  of  the  public  which  declares  the  salary  of  a general, 
of  a secretary  of  state  or  of  a singer  to  be  just  or  unjust. 

Quite  as  difficult  as  the  comparison  of  different  qualities 
or  acts  is  the  valuation  of  the  inequalities  in  the  same  sphere 
of  human  action.  That  the  statesman  deserves  a higher 
salary  than  his  secretary,  that  the  head  of  a great  firm  earns 
more  than  his  cashier,  and  the  latter  more  than  the  youngest 
clerk,  that  the  designer  in  a factory  is  more  important  than 
the  porter — in  all  this,  public  sentiment  and  valuation 

[707] 


12 


Annai^s  of  the  American  Academy. 


agree.  But  when  the  grades  of  inequality  are  to  be  meas- 
ured and  to  be  expressed  in  figures,  which  is  indispensable 
in  all  the  practical  questions,  there  will  be  many  differences 
of  opinion;  and  from  this  point  of  view  indeed  the  opinion 
might  be  upheld  that  the  psychological  judgments  which 
form  the  foundations  of  the  conceptions  of  the  just  are  always 
a chaos  without  unity  and  clearness.  The  objection  which 
we  so  often  meet  on  the  field  of  aesthetic  judgment  seems 
obvious,  that  there  is  no  general  judgment,  that  all  is  a 
matter  of  individual  taste,  that  mere  individual  processes  of 
feeling  are  in  question,  which  are  immeasurably  entangled, 
and  which  a fool  alone  could  regard  as  a basis  of  public 
affairs  and  institutions. 

This  would  in  fact  be  true,  if  the  individual  thoughts  and 
sentiments  of  men  were,  indeed,  only  the  product  of  indepen- 
dent and  isolated  individuals.  But  every  disposition  of  mind, 
every  word,  every  idea,  every  conception,  more  profoundly 
examined,  is  the  result  not  of  an  individual,  but  of  a social 
process.  The  greatest  genius  even  thinks  and  feels  as  a 
member  of  the  community;  ninety  per  cent  of  what  he 
possesses  is  a trust  conveyed  to  him  by  forefathers,  teachers, 
fellow-creatures,  to  be  cherished  and  bequeathed  to  posterity. 
The  majority  of  everyday  persons  are  little  more  than  indif- 
ferent vessels  into  which  flow  the  feelings  and  thoughts  of 
preceding  and  contemporary  millions.  Language  is  a product 
of  society.  By  means  of  the  spoken  word,  Herbart  says, 
thought  and  feeling  pass  over  into  the  mind  of  another. 
There  they  originate  new  feelings  and  thoughts,  which  forth- 
with cross  the  same  bridge,  to  enrich  the  ideas  of  the  first. 
Thus  it  happens  that  the  smallest  part  of  our  thoughts  orig- 
inates in  ourselves,  and  that  we  draw,  as  it  were,  from  a 
public  storehouse,  and  participate  in  a universal  generation 
of  thoughts  to  which  each  individual  makes  only  a compar- 
atively scanty  contribution. 

Supposing  for  the  moment  that  the  feelings  on  which  the 
estimating  judgments  of  what  is  just  are  founded,  remain 

[708] 


Justice  in  Political  Economy.  13 

wholly  in  the  obscure  realm  of  mental  temperaments,  even 
in  this  stage  they  are  not  a psychological  chaos,  but  a 
rhythmic  movement  of  masses.  And  the  more  they  rise  to 
judgments  and  standards  of  valuation,  the  more  the  mental 
temperaments  are  condensed  through  the  medium  of  public 
discussion,  to  decisions  which  possess  distinct  characteristics 
and  criteria,  the  more  we  have  before  us  mass-judgments 
which  are  not  quite  uniform,  it  is  true,  but  still  classed  ac- 
cording to  masses,  grouped  according  to  centres  and  authori- 
ties, and  which  are  clear,  firm  and  generally  admitted.  On 
account  of  the  same  qualities,  in  regard  to  the  same  purposes, 
they  give  the  same  results  again  and  again  and  become  the 
ruling  standards  of  valuation. 

Every  period  has  prevailing  conventional  standards  of  val- 
uation for  human  qualities  and  deeds,  virtues  and  vices;  it 
conventionally  values  this  kind  of  action  more  highly  than 
that,  and  so  demands  accordingly  in  one  case  greater  rewards 
or  greater  honors,  in  another  severer  punishments  or  smaller 
incomes.  These  conventional  standards  of  valuation  are 
more  or  less  the  starting-point  of  every  judgment  of  justice. 
A new  and  changed  conception  is  measured  in  the  first  in- 
stance by  its  deviation  from  the  traditions.  As  every  fixation 
of  price  in  society  is  not  anew  the  result  of  demand  and  sup- 
ply, but  as  demand  and  supply  only  try  to  modify  traditional 
values,  so  it  is  also  with  the  valuing  judgments  of  justice 
or  injustice.  The  sum  of  that  which  has  been  handed  down 
as  just,  invariably  forms  the  real  basis  of  all  judgments.  A 
refined  intuition  of  right  demands  a change  here  and  there; 
in  opposition  to  the  sum  total  of  conceptions  of  the  just,  this 
is  only  a single,  but  an  important  point. 

In  existing  customs  and  in  existing  law,  these  conventional 
and  traditional  standards  of  valuation  have  their  real  bul- 
wark; thus  they  have  assumed  a form  which  firmly,  rigidly 
and  uniformly  governs  wide  circles  of  mankind,  and  in  that 
well-defined  form  they  are  handed  down  from  generation  to 
generation.  But  they  also  can  be  found  outside  of  this  solid 

[709] 


14  Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

ground;  they  originate  everywhere  from  repetitions  of  similar 
cases  and  form  the  basis  of  judgments  of  what  is  just. 
These  judgments,  indeed,  arise  daily  and  hourly  in  the  mind 
of  every  thoughtful  man  in  regard  to  all  social  relations  of 
life;  they  are  not  confined  to  actual  law.  In  family  life  the 
sister  thinks  it  unjust  that  the  brother  is  favored;  in  every 
social  circle,  visits,  invitations,  even  smiles,  looks  and  com- 
pliments are  resented  as  unjust  preferences.  The  mental 
processes  are  the  same  whether  here  or  on  the  ground  of 
actual  law.  Everywhere  it  is  in  the  main  traditional  stand- 
ards which  govern  our  judgment.  These  traditional  and  con- 
ventional standards  are  the  historical  precipitate  of  the  concep- 
tion of  justice  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  men,  on  whose 
shoulders  we  stand.  Through  these  traditions  the  seemingly 
irregular,  the  casual  and  individual  takes  firm  body  and  last- 
ing form  in  spite  of  constant  transformations  and  renewals. 

From  this  standpoint  we  can  easily  refute  the  naive  objec- 
tion that  there  is  no  way  to  apply  the  conception  of  the  just 
to  economic  matters,  because,  it  is  said,  incomparable  quan- 
tities and  qualities  are  in  question,  the  different  kinds  of 
work,  the  functions  of  the  employer  and  the  day-laborer 
being  immeasurable  by  any  common  standard.  They  forget 
that  the  formation  of  prices  in  the  market  equalizes  that 
which  is  seemingly  incomparable,  as,  for  instance,  an  edition 
of  Goethe  and  a bottle  of  champagne;  that  in  every  penal 
code  two  things  which  appear  to  be  still  more  heterogeneous, 
a fine  of  so  and  so  much  money  and  a day’s  imprisonment 
are  in  a fixed  ratio  according  to  a conventional  standard. 
Everywhere  in  the  questions  of  prices  and  of  law  the  tradi- 
tional and  conventional  judgment,  that  this  is  to  be  called 
equal  and  not  that,  is  fundamental.  Only  should  we  have 
to  begin  every  moment  to  form  our  judgments  anew  would 
this  objection  be  reasonable.  As  things  are,  the  fact  remains 
that  the  average  earnings  of  the  employer,  compared  to  the 
wages  of  the  laborer,  can  be  raised  or  lowered  by  a change 
in  demand  and  supply  within  such  an  economic  organization 

[710] 


Justice  in  ’Pouiticau  Economy. 


15 


as  exists  to-day;  that  independently  thereof,  in  consequence 
of  traditional  standards  on  the  one  hand  and  of  the  modem 
sentiments  and  ideals  on  the  other,  this  change,  as  soon  as  it 
has  reached  a certain  extent,  will  appear  just  or  unjust. 

And  whenever  these  and  similar  questions  are  discussed, 
when  opinions  differ  about  them,  the  controversy  is  not,  as  a 
rule,  between  those  who  wish  to  apply  the  categories  of 
justice  to  these  phenomena,  and  those  who  deny  their  applica- 
bility; but  the  struggle  is  between  older  and  traditional 
standards  of  judgment  and  new  ones,  the  ideals  of  the 
eighteenth  century  with  those  of  the  nineteenth;  the  struggle 
is  between  a cruder  conception  of  right  and  a more  refined 
one,  between  ideals  whose  realization  is  to-day  impossible 
and  those  that  are  attainable  through  the  customs  and  the 
law  of  our  age;  finally  ideal  conceptions  of  justice  which 
have  already  been  co-ordinated  with  other  not  less  justified 
ideals  are  arrayed  against  those  which  have  chosen  prin- 
ciples of  justice  exclusively  for  their  battle-cry. 

And  just  because  this  struggle  never  ceases  there  is,  as  we 
have  seen  above,  no  simple,  universally  intelligible,  familiar 
and  applicable  formula  of  justice.  The  conceptions  in 
question  may  all  be  reduced  to  this  fundamental  idea:  every- 
one according  to  his  merit,  “ suum  cuique  /”  but  the  possible 
application  of  this  rule  is  always  different  according  to  the 
possibility  of  innumerable  conceptions  of  value,  estimations, 
groupings  and  classifications.  The  abstract  pretension,  for 
example,  that  in  labor  or  even  in  handiwork  rests  the  unique 
standard  of  justice  is  in  equal  right  with  the  other  pretense 
that  talent,  virtue  or  even  the  human  face  must  be  taken 
into  account.  In  certain  spheres  and  in  respect  to  certain 
aims  only  will  one  formula  or  the  other  gradually  prove  its 
justification  and  thus  gain  recognition. 

But  what  is  it  that  gives  the  final  decision  in  this  contest 
of  opinions  ? Is  it  logical  reasoning  ? Apparently  not,  or 
at  least  not  primarily.  Much  as  in  the  struggle  for  public 
and  social  institutions,  all  kinds  of  logical  reasons  for  the 


1 6 Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

justice  of  a cause  are  appealed  to,  they  seldom  convince  and 
always  seem  more  or  less  flat.  At  least  they  do  not  con- 
vince the  opponent,  although  they  are  capable  of  inciting 
their  followers  to  enthusiastic  and  desperate  struggles.  And 
this  is  natural.  They  are  not  logical  decisions.  Whether 
they  be  traditional  standards  of  valuation,  whose  immemo- 
rial age  or  even  divine  origin  impresses  our  spirits  or  newer 
conceptions,  which  by  the  power  of  passion  inflame  the 
disciples  of  a school,  a party,  the  members  of  a class  or  a 
people,  the  final  decision  rests  with  the  heart,  with  the  inner- 
most centre  of  human  soul  and  mind. 

This  explains  the  vast  possibility  of  error,  of  delusion,  of 
vehement  passions.  Ideals  of  justice  may  appear  in  the  most 
distorted  forms,  in  its  name  the  most  insane  as  well  as  the 
highest  and  holiest  things  are  demanded.  Tong  struggles  are 
often  necessary  to  purify  concepts  of  their  errors  and  to 
develop  the  ideal  in  its  purity.  But  at  the  same  time  the 
inward  connection  between  the  conceptions  of  the  “just” 
and  the  depth  of  human  emotions  explains  the  magic  power 
of  their  effect.  That  which  moves  the  inmost  heart  dominates 
the  wills,  the  egoism,  inspires  deeds  of  valor,  carries  away  the 
individual  and  millions  to  deeds  and  sacrifices.  Hence  the 
mystery  that  a political  platform,  an  economic  contrivance, 
only  influences  where  it  seems  an  outcome  of  justice.  Hence 
the  involuntary  tendency  to  appeal  to  justice  in  every  discus- 
sion. Hence  also  the  fact  that  the  same  theory  which  proposes 
a demand  of  justice  as  its  consequence  often  is  made  by  indi- 
viduals, but  repudiated  by  public  opinion;  and  then  suddenly 
with  irresistible  elementary  force  it  takes  hold  of  the  masses, 
leads  them  on  new  paths,  radically  influences  legislation  and 
puts  a changed  stamp  on  whole  epochs. 

III. 

L,et  us  return  from  discussing  the  psychological  aspect  of 
the  question,  to  the  main  substance  of  our  discourse,  which 
we  have  hitherto  only  grazed,  or  touched  upon  by  way  of 

[712] 


Justice  in  Pouiticau  Economy.  17 

illustrations.  We  have  now  to  inquire  whether  the  distribu- 
tion of  income  and  wealth  is  felt  to  be  just  or  unjust  at  all 
and  under  what  circumstances  and  conditions. 

If  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  strictly  philosophical  reflec- 
tions of  ancient  and  modern  times,  there  scarcely  seems  to 
be  any  controversy  about  the  question.  From  Aristotle’s 
doctrine  of  justice  in  distribution  to  the  philosophers  of 
to-day,  there  is  controversy  over  the  practical  effect  of  the 
judgments  in  question,  but  hardly  over  the  judgments  them- 
selves. Among  more  recent  thinkers — only  to  mention  a 
few — Herbart  conceives  the  penal  system  and  the  economic 
conditions  of  a nation  as  a united  whole;  what  elsewhere  is 
called  justice  he  denominates  as  equity.  On  equity  his  so- 
called  system  of  wages,  which  comprises  the  economic  condi- 
tions and  the  penal  law  of  a nation,  is  built  up;  the  judgment 
requires  recompense  for  benefits  and  retribution  for  misdeeds. 
The  conceptions  of  the  wage  system  must,  according  to  Har- 
tenstein,  be  applied  equally  to  benefits  and  misdeeds.  “ The 
general  idea  must  be  maintained,  that  the  social  institutions 
and  actions  should  be  capable  and  fitted  to  requite  equally 
merit  and  offence.”  And  Trendelenburg,  in  a similar 
fashion,  affirms  that  the  moral  estimation  of  political  and 
economic  affairs  is,  at  bottom,  derived  from  the  same  stand- 
point. “Indeed,”  he  says,  “in  the  structure  of  the  State 
the  constant  proportion  between  duties  and  rights  is  the 
fundamental  idea  of  justice,  and  the  same  proportion  between 
labor  and  earnings  should  be  aimed  at  in  private  intercourse, 
but  the  market  price  makes  the  exponent  so  variable,  that  it 
causes  a constant  inequality.  ’ ’ The  execution  thus  seems  dim 
to  him;  but  it  appears  to  him  the  ideal  condition,  that  labor 
and  earnings  should  accord,  as  duty  does  with  right. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  this  conception  is  confronted  by 
another  which  results  from  the  investigation  of  details,  which 
is  not  the  outgrowth  of  popular  instincts  and  sentiment,  and 
is  even  often  involuntarily  denied  by  its  very  representatives, 
but  through  the  authority  of  certain  doctrines  has  become 

[713] 


1 8 Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

nevertheless  of  great  importance  for  practical  life.  I mean 
the  conception  which  sees  in  the  difference  between  rich  and 
poor  only  an  occurrence  of  nature.  In  the  investigation  of 
the  immediate  causes  of  the  distribution  of  wealth,  this  con- 
ception is  not  able  to  discover  the  remoter  causes.  It  sees 
only  demand  and  supply,  proportions,  natural  phenomena, 
climatic  influences,  the  accidents  of  life  and  death;  all  these 
are  unquestionably  mechanical  causes  which  influence  this 
or  that  distribution  of  incomes.  The  earnings  of  the  indi- 
vidual, it  is  said,  are  determined  by  the  “ strength  and  the 
luck  of  the  individual.  ’ ’ Free  intercourse  appears  as  the 
analogy  of  the  Darwinian  struggle  for  existence.  Might 
makes  right;  purposes  and  moral  judgments  are  not  here  in 
consideration,  or  only  to  a limited  extent.  So  far  as  man- 
kind demands  a just  distribution  of  incomes,  their  ideas  are 
in  the  main  foolish;  justice  may  at  the  most  be  demanded 
of  the  State  when  it  intervenes  directly;  opposed  as  it  is  to 
free  intercourse  and  the  legitimate  influence  of  fortune,  this 
striving  is  wrong.  ‘ ‘ Shall  we,  ’ ’ we  hear  from  this  quarter, 
“ censure  our  God,  that  He  so  frequently  interferes  unjustly  ? 
Shall  we  prescribe  to  Him  where  His  lightnings  shall  strike 
and  where  He  shall  permit  the  bullets  to  hit?  Shall  we 
quarrel  with  nature  because  she  grants  the  delicious  fruits  of 
the  south  and  an  Olympic  existence  to  one  race,  while  she 
banishes  another  to  the  reeking  hovels  of  the  arctic  ? ’ ’ 

We  will  not  dismiss  this  conception  of  things  by  the  accu- 
sation of  materialism,  for,  though  materialistic,  it  neverthe- 
less has  the  merit  of  being  realistic  and  of  having  further 
detailed  investigation  in  certain  directions.  But  whatever  its 
merits  in  this  direction,  our  question  is  not  really  touched  at 
all  by  these  arguments.  The  individual  scholar  who,  in  his 
researches,  considers  only  forces,  proportions,  demand  and 
supply,  and  endeavors  to  grasp  them,  may  ignore  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  result  be  just,  but  the  popular  mind  will 
always  repeat  the  question  as  long  as  it  sees  before  it  human 
actions. 


[714] 


Justice  in  Politic al  Economy. 


19 


But  only  to  this  extent  and  always  to  this  extent;  and  fur- 
thermore the  uncertain  results  of  fortune  and  the  course  of 
natural  processes  also  will  appear  just  or  unjust  to  him  who 
believes  that  they  are  governed  by  a just  Providence  ruling 
analogously  to  human  actions;  may  the  compensation  only 
occur  in  another  world,  it  is  expected  and  demanded  by  the 
soul. 

When  on  the  other  hand  the  intellect  sees  but  blind  forces, 
it  consoles  itself  with  the  argument  that  it  is  not  the  task  of 
humanity  to  master  them;  then  he  will  no  longer  demand 
justice  from  the  flashing  lightning,  from  the  hostile  bullet, 
from  the  demon  of  cholera  and  the  sunny  zephyrs,  but 
always  from  all  conscious  actions  of  human  beings. 

The  distinction  is  therefore  not,  as  has  been  claimed, 
between  State  and  chance,  State  and  free  intercourse,  gov- 
ernmental distribution  and  distribution  by  demand  and  sup- 
ply, but  the  antithesis  is  this:  As  far  as  human  action 
governs  and  influences  the  distribution  of  incomes,  so  far 
this  action  will  create  the  psychological  processes  whose 
final  result  is  the  judgment  which  finds  the  distribution  just 
or  unjust;  so  far  as  blind  extra-human  causes  interfere,  rea- 
sonable reflection  will  demand  that  men  should  submit  to 
them  with  resignation. 

If  it  is  objected  that  demand  and  supply  distribute 
incomes,  we  reply  in  the  first  instance:  Are  demand  and 
supply  blind  powers  independent  of  human  influence  ? This 
year’s  crops  depend  on  rain  and  sunshine,  but  the  average 
results  of  our  crops  are  a product  of  our  cultivation. 
Demand  and  supply  are  summary  terms  for  the  magnitudes 
of  opposing  groups  of  human  wills.  The  causes  and  condi- 
tions of  these  magnitudes  are  partly  natural,  mostly,  how- 
ever, human  relations  and  powers,  human  deliberations  and 
actions. 

If  it  is  objected  that  nature  conditions  the  wealth  of 
a nation,  we  answer:  She  certainly  does  in  part,  and  as  far 
as  she  does,  no  one  thinks  it  unjust  that  one  nation  is  rich 

[715] 


20 


Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 


and  the  other  poor.  But  when  one  nation  enslaves,  plun- 
ders and  keeps  in  subjection  another,  we  immediately  find 
the  wealth  of  the  former  and  the  poverty  of  the  latter  unjust. 

If  it  is  objected  that  the  one  man  is  wealthier  than  the 
other  because  he  was  not  compelled  to  divide  his  inherit- 
ance with  brother  and  sister,  that  the  one  has  the  good 
fortune  to  possess  a healthy  wife,  the  other  not,  we  answer: 
No  normal  feeling  of  right  wishes  to  do  away  with  such 
chance  of  fortune.  But  the  question  is,  if  such  effects  of 
nature,  not  subject  to  our  influence,  which  we  call  fortune 
or  chance,  are  indeed  the  essential  causes  of  the  distribution 
of  incomes  and  wealth.  In  such  a case  there  could  be  no 
science  of  political  economy  or  social  policy,  for  the  irregular 
game  of  chance  cannot  be  brought  under  general  points  of 
view. 

If  it  is  objected  that  labor  and  not  the  State  distributes 
incomes,  we  answer  that  this  is  a surprising  objection  in 
the  mouth  of  one  who  declares  strength  and  fortune  both 
at  the  same  time  to  be  the  causes  of  distribution.  For  the 
objection  has  meaning  only  when  it  signifies  that  different 
labor  and  different  accomplishments  produce  correspond- 
ingly different  compensation.  In  our  eyes,  labor  produces 
goods,  builds  houses,  bakes  bread,  but  it  does  not  directly 
distribute  incomes.  The  different  kinds  of  labor  will  affect 
distribution  only  by  their  different  valuations  in  society. 
The  demand  for  this  or  that  labor  will  influence  its  market 
price,  but  the  moral  valuation  of  this  or  that  labor  will  influ- 
ence the  judgment  whether  this  price  is  just.  Thus  labor 
influences,  indirectly  it  is  true,  the  distribution  of  incomes; 
but  in  such  a case,  and  so  far  as  it  does  so,  it  excludes  the 
notion  of  luck  or  chance. 

Both  assertions,  however,  confine  themselves  too  closely  to 
the  individual  distribution  of  incomes,  whereas  for  the  econ- 
omist the  essential  point  is  the  distribution  among  the 
classes  of  society.  For  every  more  general  scientific  or 
practical  inquiry  it  is  not  the  important  point  whether  Tom, 


Justice  in  Political  Economy.  21 

the  day  laborer,  has  more  than  Dick  or  Harry,  whether  the 
grocer,  Jones,  earns  more  than  Brown,  whether  the  banker, 
Bleichroder,  has  better  luck  in  his  speculations  than  the 
banker,  Hanseman;  about  this  general  judgments  will  only 
occasionally  be  formed.  The  average  wages  of  the  day 
laborer,  the  average  condition  of  domestic  workers,  the  aver- 
age profits  of  the  class  of  promoters,  the  average  profits  of 
grocers,  of  landed  proprietors,  of  farmers  on  the  other  hand 
are  considered  by  public  opinion  and  judged  to  be  justified  or 
not.  And  these  earnings  are  surely  not  dependent  on  fortune 
or  chance;  they  are  the  result  of  the  average  qualities  of  the 
respective  classes  in  connection  with  their  relations  to  the 
other  classes  of  society;  they  are  in  the  main  the  result  of 
human  institutions. 

The  prevailing  rights  of  property,  inheritance  and  con- 
tract form  the  centre  of  the  institutions  which  govern  the 
distribution  of  incomes.  Their  forms  for  the  time  being 
determine  a democratic  or  aristocratic  distribution  of  wealth. 
Who,  for  instance,  has  made  the  division  of  landed  property, 
which  generally  determines  the  distribution  of  both  wealth 
and  income  ? Is  it  nature,  luck  or  chance,  or  demand  and 
supply?  No,  in  the  first  place  the  social  and  agrarian  insti- 
tutions of  the  past  and  present.  Wherever  small  peasant 
proprietorship  prevails  to-day,  it  is  derived  from  the 
mediaeval  village  community  system  and  the  law  of  peasant 
succession.  Wherever  we  meet  with  a system  of  large 
estates  we  see  a result  of  the  baronial  and  feudal  system,  of 
the  later  manorial  regime  and  of  the  system  of  estates;  at 
present  the  institutions  of  mortgages  and  leases  play  a part; 
the  legislation  touching  the  commutation  of  tenures  and 
system  of  cultivation  were  of  the  same  importance  to  Ger- 
many as  the  colonial  system  of  other  governments  to  their 
colonies.  In  the  distribution  of  personal  property  individual 
qualities  are  more  prevalent  than  in  that  of  real  estate.  But 
nevertheless  the  institutions  of  ancient  and  modern  times  seem 
to  us  the  most  important.  The  forms  of  undertakings  and  the 

[717] 


22 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


legal  status  of  the  laboring  classes  are  the  essential  points  ; 
wherever  slavery  prevailed  it  governed  at  all  times  the  whole 
economic  life,  the  whole  social  classification  and  the  distribu- 
tion of  incomes;  guilds  were,  at  the  time  of  their  consistent 
maintenance,  as  much  an  institution  of  distribution  of  incomes 
as  an  organization  of  labor;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  domes- 
tic system  of  industry  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
century  with  its  governmental  regulation;  the  ruling  con- 
siderations were  the  needs  of  commerce  and  technical  prac- 
tice on  the  one  hand,  the  situation  of  the  laborers  in  a domestic 
system  of  industries  on  the  other.  And  are  not  to-day  the 
institutions  of  unrestricted  trade  and  interest  on  loans,  of  the 
exchanges  and  the  system  of  public  debts,  the  forms  of  under- 
takings, the  system  of  joint  stock  companies,  of  co-operative 
associations,  the  unions  and  corporations  of  employers  and 
laborers,  all  labor  law,  the  institutions  of  friendly  and  sim- 
ilar societies  the  material  foundation  and  cause  of  our  present 
distribution  of  incomes?  The  individual  causes  and  the 
chance  of  luck  effect  within  the  bounds  of  these  institutions 
the  little  aberrations  of  personal  destiny;  the  position  of 
social  classes  in  general  is  determined  by  the  institutions. 

What  are  economic  institutions  but  a product  of  human 
feelings  and  thought,  of  human  actions,  human  customs  and 
human  laws  ? And  just  this  causes  us  to  apply  the  standard 
of  justice  to  their  results,  just  this  makes  us  inquire  whether 
they  and  their  effects  are  just  or  unjust.  We  do  not  require 
the  distribution  of  incomes  or  wealth  to  be  just  absolutely; 
we  do  not  require  it  of  technical  economic  acts  which  do  not 
concern  others;  but  we  do  require  the  numerous  economic 
acts  which  on  the  basis  of  barter  and  division  of  labor  con- 
cern others  and  entire  communities  to  be  just. 

Where  such  acts  come  into  consideration  our  observations 
discern  moral  communities,  their  common  aims  and  the 
human  qualities,  which  are  connected  with  these  aims. 

The  most  primitive  barter  is  impossible,  unless,  between  the 
parties  practising  it  regularly,  a certain  moral  understanding 

[718] 


Justice  in  Poeiticae  Economy. 


23 


exists.  There  must  have  been  an  express  or  silent  mutual 
agreement  to  preserve  peace.  The  barterers  must  have 
common  conceptions  of  value,  must  recognize  a common 
law.  Every  seller  forms  with  the  purchaser,  who  stands 
before  him  at  the  moment  of  the  transaction,  a moral  union 
of  confidence. 

In  epochs  of  primitive  culture,  in  the  social  communities 
of  families,  of  kinship,  of  tribes,  of  leagues,  there  exists 
an  uncommonly  strong  feeling  of  solidarity  which  therefore 
leads  to  very  far-reaching  demands  of  justice  within  these 
circles,  as  well  as  to  a complete  obtuseness  of  the  same  feel- 
ing beyond  them.  With  a higher  degree  of  culture  these 
small  communities  lose,  the  individual  and  the  greater 
communities  gain  in  importance.  Now  the  individual  and 
now  the  community  appears  more  in  the  foreground,  and 
accordingly  the  consciousness  of  the  community  of  interests 
will  change  in  intensity.  In  the  periods  in  which  the  indi- 
vidual’s or  the  family’s  technical  economic  life  still  forms, 
without  more  extensive  intercourse,  without  more  elaborate 
division  of  labor,  the  centre  of  gravity  in  economics,  the 
feeling  of  community  in  economic  matters  will  recede.  The 
further  the  division  of  labor  progresses,  the  more  inextricably 
will  the  threads  of  intercourse  involve  the  individual  in  an 
insoluble  social  community,  the  more  the  whole  production 
will  assume  the  character  of  a general,  not  an  individual 
concern.  Then  the  common  functions  of  the  local  and  the 
national  community  will  thrive,  individuals  will  be  more  and 
more  dislodged  by  social  leaders.  Every  larger  undertaking, 
whenever  it  unites  continuously  a certain  number  of  men 
for  a common  economic  purpose,  reveals  itself  as  a moral 
community.  It  governs  the  external  and  internal  life  of  all 
participants,  determines  their  residence,  school,  division  of 
time,  family  life,  to  a certain  degree  their  mental  horizon, 
education  and  pleasure.  The  relations  of  those  concerned 
necessarily  exchange  a merely  economic  for  a generally  moral 
character.  And  therefrom  the  conception  arises;  here  a 

[719] 


24 


Annaes  of  thk  American  Academy. 


common  production  exists,  hence  a moral  community.  And 
that  leads  to  the  question : Is  the  relation  between  the  partic- 
ipants, is  the  division  of  the  products  a just  one?  And 
similar  considerations  follow  for  whole  industries,  for  whole 
social  classes,  and  this  all  the  more,  the  more  frequently  the 
employers  and  the  laborers  are  organized  into  associations 
and  societies.  They  also  result  for  whole  States  and  unions 
of  States. 

The  moral  communities,  which  play  a part  in  economics, 
follow  sometimes  purely  economic  purposes,  sometimes  other 
purposes,  as  above  all  do  local  communities  and  the  State.  The 
narrower  their  circle,  the  simpler  and  clearer  their  purpose, 
the  more  evident  become  the  qualities,  according  to  which 
moral  judgment  compares  and  classifies  men.  The  more 
comprehensive  they  are,  the  more  manifold  their  purposes, 
the  more  complicated  becomes  the  question  which  qualities 
are  concerned,  the  more  fluctuating  becomes  the  judgment 
of  what  is  just,  the  more  indispensable  for  customs  and  laws 
become  conventional  presumptions  and  standards  in  order  to 
attain  something  definite  at  all. 

In  times  of  primitive  culture,  in  the  small  circles  of  eco- 
nomic and  moral  communities  all  men,  or  at  least  all  men 
able  to  bear  arms,  may  readily  appear  equal,  and  so  it  there 
appears  just  to  give  each  the  same  allotment  of  land,  the 
same  share  of  booty.  The  guild  sought  to  secure  to  each 
member  as  nearly  as  possible  an  equal  share  of  profit.  With 
higher  culture  begins  the  necessary  discrimination . F ormerly 
the  greater  allotments  were  often  given  to  the  bravest  soldier 
and  to  the  noble  families,  distinctions  now  become  more 
general.  All  inherited  preference  is  considered  just,  in  the 
measure  in  which  public  sentiment  values  not  the  qualities 
of  the  single  individual,  but  of  families  as  a whole,  a con- 
ception which  decreases  more  and  more  with  higher  culture. 
Inherited  wealth,  as  long  as  it  appears  necessarily  and  obvi- 
ously coupled  with  its  possessor,  is  under  some  conditions 
regarded  as  a just  standard  of  the  distribution  of  goods.  So 

[720] 


Justice  in  Politic  at  Economy. 


25 


the  distribution  of  public  lands  according  to  the  possessions 
in  cattle  and  real  estate  appeared  quite  just  to  many  a 
day  laborer  and  ‘ ‘ kossaeth  ’ ’ in  the  eastern  provinces  of 
Prussia,  while  to  one  who  knew  the  public  land  systems 
in  France  or  southern  Germany  it  seemed  an  outrageous 
injustice. 

For  all  community  of  production,  labor  is  the  most  obvious 
standard;  hence  perhaps  it  is  the  most  usual,  most  generally 
comprehensible.  As  soon  as  it  becomes  necessary  to  compare 
many  different  kinds  of  labor,  only  an  abstraction  totally 
foreign  to  public  sentiment  will  conceive  the  idea  of  reducing 
all  this  labor  to  mere  quantities  of  handiwork;  natural  public 
sentiment  will  simply  value  more  highly  the  labor  which 
requires  more  education  or  talent. 

Those  qualities  will  always  be  most  highly  considered 
which  serve  the  common  objects;  those  which  only  relate  to 
the  individual  and  his  selfish  aims  are  less  esteemed.  Only 
a complete  misconception  therefore  could  establish  individual 
needs  as  a standard  of  distributing  justice.  Older  socialism 
wisely  held  aloof  at  all  times  from  this  aberration.  Even 
the  first  really  social-democratic  platform  in  Germany,  that 
of  Eisenach  of  1869,  did  not  yet  venture  to  commit  such  a 
folly.  The  progressive  victory  of  vulgarity  and  rudeness  first 
demanded  in  the  Gotha  platform  of  1875  the  division  of  the 
aggregate  labor  products  among  individuals  according  to  their 
“reasonable  needs.”  The  proviso  of  reasonableness  was 
intended  to  prevent  excesses;  it  does  not  remove  the  low  con- 
ception. With  his  needs  a man  serves  himself  only;  with 
his  labor,  his  virtue,  his  accomplishments,  he  serves  man- 
kind, and  these  determine  the  judgment  which  esteems  them 
as  just. 

When  the  great  social  communities  which  follow  the  most 
various  interests  and  what  is  just  in  them  are  concerned,  the 
attempt  will  always  be  made,  more  or  less,  to  weigh  the  dif- 
ferent qualities  and  accomplishments  of  men  in  their  result 
and  in  their  connection  with  the  objects  of  the  community. 


26 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


Talents  and  knowledge,  virtues  and  accomplishments,  merit 
in  short  is  considered.  Moral  qualities  are  often  apparently 
overlooked,  great  talents  whose  achievements  and  deeds  are 
generally  visible  are  apparently  over-estimated.  But  only 
because  one  is  more  noticed  than  the  other,  and  the  moral 
judgment  which  values  individuals  according  to  what  they 
are  to  the  whole  can  naturally  only  judge  by  what  it  sees. 

And  therein  lies  the  contrast  between  moral  and  economic 
value.  In  the  ordinary  economic  valuation  activities  and 
products  have  value  in  the  same  measure,  as  individuals  covet 
them  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  personal  needs.  In  the 
moral  valuation,  on  which  the  judgment  as  to  justice  de- 
pends, the  activities  of  individuals  receive  their  value,  accord- 
ing as  they  serve  the  inherent  ends  of  the  whole.  True  jus- 
tice, says  Ihering,  is  a balancing  between  consequences  and 
acts,  which  is  weighed  equally  to  all  citizens  according  to  the 
measure  of  the  value  of  these  acts  to  society.  Both  valua- 
tions go  in  life  side  by  side,  combating  and  influencing  one 
another.  The  one  rules  the  market,  the  other  moral  judg- 
ments and  conceptions.  They  approach  each  other  as  man- 
kind grows  more  perfect.  Through  what  mechanism  the 
arising  conflicts  are  lessened  and  mitigated,  we  still  have  to 
discuss. 

IV. 

If  in  the  economic  order  we  could  recognize  only  the  ruling 
of  blind  forces,  of  selfish  interests,  natural  masses  and  me- 
chanical processes,  it  would  be  a constant  battle,  a chaotic 
anarchy;  it  would  present  the  “ bellum  omnium  contra 
omnes. 9 ’ That  this  is  not  the  case  was  perceived  by  those 
who  saw  in  the  exertion  of  egoism  the  only  motive  force  of 
economic  life;  they  helped  themselves  over  the  inexplicable 
conclusion  that  out  of  the  blind  struggle  of  selfish  individuals 
peaceful  society  should  grow  out,  with  the  ideal  conception 
of  a pre-established  harmony  of  forces  as  in  the  conception 
of  Leibnitz.  And  yet  any  impartial  glance  at  life  tells  us 

[722] 


Justice  in  Political  Economy. 


27 


that  this  harmony  does  not  exist,  but  that  it  is  striven  for 
slowly  and  gradually. 

No,  harmony  does  not  exist  per  se;  selfish  impulses  combat 
each  other,  natural  masses  tend  to  destroy  each  other,  the 
mechanical  action  of  natural  forces  interferes  relentlessly  still 
to-day;  the  struggle  for  existence  is  to-day  still  carried  on  in 
the  struggle  of  competition;  the  buoyancy  of  individual 
activity  has  even  with  the  noblest  and  most  distinguished 
men  a flavor  of  egoism;  with  the  masses  it  is,  inwardly  curbed 
indeed  by  the  moral  results  of  social  life,  the  potent  cause 
of  most  actions.  While  struggle  and  strife  never  cease  they 
do  not  preserve  the  same  character  throughout  the  course  of 
history.  The  struggle  which  ended  in  annihilation,  in  sub- 
jugation, turns  into  a peaceful  contest  which  is  decided  by 
an  umpire.  The  forms  of  dependence  grow  milder  and  more 
human.  Class  government  grows  more  moderate.  Every 
brutal  strength,  every  undue  assertion  of  superior  force  is 
made  punishable  by  law.  Demand  and  supply,  as  they  con- 
front each  other  in  the  different  systems  of  custom  and  law, 
are  quite  different  in  their  result.  In  short  all  emanations 
of  egoism  are  moderated,  regulated  and  restrained  by  the 
moral  cultivation  of  the  labor  of  many  thousand  years.  That 
this  is  so  is  the  simple  consequence  of  those  ideal  conceptions 
which  originate  in  social  life,  form  the  centre  of  all  religions, 
all  systems  of  social  ethics,  all  morals  and  all  law.  And  in 
the  realm  of  these  ideal  conceptions  the  idea  of  justice,  if  not 
the  first  and  only  power,  is  none  the  less  one  of  the  most 
important.  Others  of  equal  might  are  grouped  with  it. 
Aside  from  the  idea  of  God,  of  immortality,  of  perfection 
and  of  progress,  the  idea  of  justice  which  gives  each  one  his 
share,  is  confronted  in  the  field  of  social  policy  by  some  other 
ideas.  These  are  in  the  first  place  the  idea  of  community, 
which  allots  to  the  whole  that  which  belongs  to  it,  which 
regards  the  promotion  of  the  whole  more  than  the  rights  of 
the  parts;  in  the  second  place  the  idea  of  benevolence,  which 
in  its  consciousness  of  community  gives  more  to  the  poor 

[723] 


28 


Annans  of  the  American  Academy. 


man  than  he  can  justly  demand;  finally,  the  idea  of  liberty, 
which  permits  each  part  to  act  freely,  placing  numerous 
limits  upon  justice  and  the  community.  That  this  results 
in  many  restrictions  upon  the  exercise  of  justice  we  will 
here  only  suggest,  not  demonstrate.  But  the  fact  always 
remains  that  the  constantly  growing  and  developing  concep- 
tions of  justice  extend  their  influence  daily  and  hourly  into 
the  activity  of  practical  life,  that  in  the  form  of  moral  and 
religious  sense  of  duty,  social  custom  and  actual  law,  they 
regulate  and  modify  rude  forces  and  selfish  impulses.  The 
conflict  between  interest  and  moral  ideas  will  of  course  never 
cease,  but  only  be  moderated.  All  human  life  only  exists 
under  the  presumption  of  this  never  ceasing  internal  combat. 
There  are  always  claims  of  economic  justice  which  appear  to 
be  only  bold  ideal  dreams;  but  there  are  always  many  which 
have  conquered  in  life,  or  at  least  have  obtained  for  them- 
selves the  majorities,  the  leading  powers.  And  to  them  the 
more  refined  economic  culture  owes  its  humane  character. 

Practically  the  most  important  form  in  which  these  ideas 
conquer  is  that  of  custom  and  of  law.  Without  these  formal 
means  the  conceptions  and  judgments  of  justice  cannot 
easily  be  realized,  cannot  easily  be  transmitted  from  genera- 
tion to  generation.  Custom  and  law  lend  permanence  and 
stability  to  ideas  of  morality,  and  effect  the  agreement  of 
men  about  that  which  ought  to  be.  From  the  moral  dispo- 
sition of  men  arise  rules  of  custom,  which  as  distinct  rules 
of  life  curb  the  wild  play  of  passions  and  impulses.  Custom 
is  that  which  we  regularly  practice,  originating  in  experi- 
ence and  recollection,  in  the  judicious  conception  of  com- 
mon purpose  and  in  moral  reflection.  As  crude  as  custom 
may  originally  be,  its  rule  is  always  an  improvement  in 
comparison  with  the  purely  natural  play  of  instincts.  It  ap- 
pears to  the  growing  generation  the  appropriate,  necessary, 
just  and  obvious  condition  of  all  intercourse,  all  division  of 
labor,  all  social  existence.  As  an  independent  power  it  con- 
fronts the  individuals  and  their  impulses  and  becomes  the 

[724] 


Justice  in  Politic al  Economy. 


29 


foundation  of  all  morals,  all  religion,  as  well  as  all  rights 
and  all  institutions. 

Originally  inflexible  and  relentless  in  itself,  custom  later 
becomes  more  variable  in  individual  morality,  adapts  itself 
to  conditions,  though  it  still  exacts  the  more  noble  and  sub- 
lime; in  the  positive  law,  which  is  gradually  separated  from 
custom,  it  becomes  a rule,  demanding  less,  but  for  this 
‘ ‘ less  * ’ a much  stricter  obedience.  Custom  in  higher  stages 
of  culture  only  prevails  through  fear  of  reproach,  of  con- 
tempt, of  social  ostracism.  Formal  law  only  chooses  the 
rules  of  social  life  most  important  for  common  interest,  but 
enforces  their  observation,  when  necessary,  through  the 
physical  compulsion  which  the  whole  can  exercise  over  the 
individual. 

Internally  of  the  same  nature  as  morals  and  custom,  i.  e.y 
originating  equally  in  social  ideals  and  primarily  in  the  idea 
of  justice,  the  law  adopts  through  its  external,  formal  nature 
the  character  of  something  independent,  in  consequence  of 
which  independence  the  law  can  only  uphold  justice  within 
its  own  range  and  can  only  execute  it  in  a certain  sense. 

To  the  essence  of  right  and  law,  as  it  has  been  evolved 
from  religion,  morals  and  customs  by  an  experience  of  many 
thousand  years,  belongs  above  all  the  uniform  and  sure 
execution  of  the  rules  which  have  once  been  confirmed 
universally  and  uniformly.  Without  uniform  application, 
without  a sure  administration,  law  does  not  remain  law.  To 
achieve  this  is  extraordinarily  difficult,  on  account  of  the 
manifold  complexity  of  life.  The  goal  we  can  only  reach  by 
limiting  ourselves  to  that  which  is  of  the  most  importance 
and  by  long,  laborious,  logical  brain- work,  which  reduces 
the  rules  of  law  to  a few  clear  and  universally  intelligible 
sentences.  The  exercise  of  the  judicial  power  is  raised  by 
this  quality  above  the  level  of  personal  feelings  and  changing 
disposition,  laws  are  guided  by  it  to  a safe  and  uniform  appli- 
cation. The  more  severely  law  interferes,  subordinates  de- 
tails, proceeds  radically  and  relentlessly,  the  more  important 

[725] 


30  Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

this  formal  criterion  grows.  The  uniform  and  just  ap- 
plication of  law  becomes  so  important  that  the  imperfect 
law  whose  just  application  is  secured  is  preferred  to  the 
more  perfect  and  materially  more  just  law  whose  application 
varies,  becomes  uncertain  and  thus  unjust  everywhere  or  in 
the  hands  of  judges  and  officials  of  to-day.  Nearly  all  posi- 
tive law,  therefore,  and  especially  written  law,  which  the 
thinking  mind  generates  by  the  machinery  of  legislation, 
which  has  not  as  customary  law  been  derived  from  use,  is 
inflexible,  feeble,  confined  to  outward,  clearly  visible  marks; 
it  cannot  regard  individualities  and  their  natures,  it  deals 
with  rough  averages.  Instead  of  testing  individuals,  for 
example,  it  divides  adults  and  minors  according  to  a fixed 
age,  approximately  correct  for  the  totality,  but  more  or  less 
arbitrary  in  regard  to  the  individual.  It  calls  all  adult  men 
to  the  polls,  not  because  they  are  really  of  equal  importance 
to  the  commonwealth,  but  because  the  application  of  every 
more  complicated  distinction  would  result  practically  in 
greater  injustices.  Thus  law  becomes  often  inequitable  and 
materially  unjust,  not  because  formal  justice  is  superior,  but 
because  it  is  more  easily  attained  in  the  existing  stage  of 
civilization.  This  gives  rise  to  thousands  of  conflicts  between 
material  and  formal  justice,  which  are  so  often  decisive  for 
the  practical  questions  of  distribution  of  wealth  and  incomes. 

If  there  is  any  demand  of  justice  which  it  is  desired  to 
introduce  into  our  institutions  through  the  channel  of  ordi- 
nary reform  by  positive  law,  it  is  not  only  necessary  that  the 
demand  be  recognized  and  desired  by  the  best  as  right,  that 
it  must  have  become  custom  in  certain  places,  that  it  must 
have  overcome  the  resisting  powers  of  egoism,  of  listless 
indolence  which  clings  to  tradition,  that  it  should  have 
triumphed  over  the  eventual  obstruction  of  the  other  ethical 
ideas,  which  tending  toward  other  goals,  often  may  be  an 
obstacle,  that  it  should  have  become  a dogma  of  ruling 
parties  and  statesmen.  No,  it  must  also  have  evolved  the 
qualities  of  a practicable  formal  law,  it  must  have  reached 

[726] 


Justice  in  Poeiticae  Economy.  31 

fixed  boundaries,  clear  characteristics,  determined  qualities 
and  proportions;  it  must  have  traversed  the  long  journey 
from  a conception  of  right  to  a clearly  defined  and  limited 
provision  of  law,  the  fundamental  judgments  of  value  must 
be  condensed  to  a fixed  conventional  scale,  which,  as  a simple 
expression  of  complicated  and  manifold  conditions  still  grasps 
their  average  justly.  In  short  the  mechanism  of  positive 
law  limits  every  execution  of  material  justice.  We  have 
our  formal  right  only  at  the  expense  of  a partial  material 
injustice. 

A demand  of  justice  in  rewarding  great  inventors  can 
to-day  only  become  positive  law  in  patent  legislation,  or  in 
the  public  arrangement  of  a system  of  premiums,  in  which 
the  method  of  execution  is  just  as  important  as  the  principle. 
A demand  of  justice  in  regard  to  a progressive  income  tax 
can  count  upon  sympathy  only  when  the  demand  is  based 
on  definite  figures  which  correspond  to  the  average  feeling 
of  right  of  to-day.  The  demand  of  justice  that  the  employer 
should  provide  better  for  his  laborers  becomes  practicable, 
when  we  demand  in  detail  and  definitely  that  the  employer 
carry  this  or  that  responsibility  for  accidents,  that  he  put 
such  and  such  a contribution  into  the  benefit  fund,  that  he 
accept  the  verdict  of  umpires  with  regard  to  wages.  That 
the  laborers  should  share  in  the  profits  of  the  enterprise  can 
be  discussed  as  a legal  measure  only  when  definite  experi- 
ence shows  the  possibility  of  a just  execution.  Otherwise 
such  a law,  like  many  other  well-meant  propositions  for  the 
improvement  of  the  condition  of  the  lower  classes,  would, 
in  consequence  of  the  violation  of  formal  justice,  lead  to  arbi- 
trariness, to  favoritism,  to  the  discontent  of  the  classes  con- 
cerned. This  is  confirmed  by  all  deeper  knowledge  of  the 
results  of  the  administration  of  our  poor  laws.  The  poor 
law  is  the  most  important  piece  of  socialism  which  the 
German  social  organization  contains.  It  is  a piece  of 
socialism  which  we  could  not  spare  for  the  time  being, 
because  we  do  not  know  a better  substitute,  nor  yet  how  to 

[727] 


32  Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

meet  otherwise  by  more  perfect  institutions  the  inevitable 
demand  of  justice,  that  every  fellow-being  be  protected  from 
starvation.  The  drawback  of  this  poor  law  is  the  absolute 
impossibility  of  enforcing  it  in  a formally  and  materially  just 
way.  Arbitrariness,  chance,  red  tape  govern  it,  and  there- 
fore the  assistance  given  has  in  many  cases  such  unfavorable 
psychological  effects,  leading  to  laziness  and  indifference. 
As  long  as  the  organs  of  the  administration  do  not  reach 
a far  higher  perfection,  as  long  as  the  formal  possibilities 
of  execution  are  not  quite  different,  most  socialistic  experi- 
ments would  only  extend  the  consequences  of  our  poor  laws 
to  large  areas  of  our  social  and  economic  organization. 

But  we  must  never  forget  the  distinction  between  means 
and  ends.  The  form  of  the  law  is  the  means,  justice,  how- 
ever, the  end.  We  may  perceive  that  laws  cannot  do  away 
with  every  immorality,  cannot  effect  a strictly  just  distribu- 
tion of  incomes;  that  the  ingenious  tricks  of  astute  and  sel- 
fish business  men  flout  all  decency,  and  find  ways  to  slip 
through  the  meshes  of  the  best  laws.  But  this  must  not 
restrain  us  from  working  for  justice,  and  from  faith  in  its 
victory.  Although  thousands  of  injustices  are  bound  to 
occur  in  our  life,  our  best  possession  rests  on  the  idea  of  jus- 
tice. All  social  progress  depends  on  further  victories  of 
justice.  By  demanding  a just  distribution  of  incomes,  social- 
ism has  introduced  nothing  new,  but  has  in  contrast  to  the 
errors  which  were  created  by  materialistic  epigones  in  a 
short  period  of  so-called  philosophy  of  enlightenment,  only 
returned  to  the  great  traditions  of  all  idealistic  social  philos- 
ophy. The  error  of  socialism  was  simply  that  it  overlooked 
the  difference  between  material  and  formal  justice,  as  well 
as  the  significance  of  other  equally  justified  social  ideal 
conceptions;  that  it  imagined  the  individual  conceptions  of 
certain  idealists  of  what  is  just,  would  suffice  to  overthrow 
suddenly  and  immediately  primeval  institutions.  With  its 
crude  excrescences  it  returned  to  standards  of  justice  which 
perhaps  correspond  to  the  first  stages  of  civilization,  certainly 

[728] 


Justice  in  Pouticau  Economy.  33 

to  rough  views,  but  not  to  refined  conceptions  of  higher 
morality. 

Socialism  can  teach  us  not  to  demand  a false  justice;  it 
should  never  hinder  us  from  fighting  for  a true  justice. 
History  tells  us  that  progress  has  usually  been  tedious;  it 
shows  us  just  as  much  that  at  length  the  greatest  formal 
difficulties  have  been  overcome;  that  especially  in  the  great 
epochs  of  faith  in  ideals  which  rejuvenate  and  ennoble  men, 
the  juster  right,  the  refined  morals  have  triumphed  over  the 
powers  of  egoism,  of  sluggishness,  of  stupidity,  and  now 
better  and  juster  institutions  have  grown  up.  There  was  a 
time  when  the  demand  for  a just  system  of  trade,  which  is 
universally  conceded  to-day,  appeared  as  an  ideal  far  in 
advance  of  the  times.  Robberies,  thefts,  frauds,  brawls  in 
the  market-places,  extortions  of  gifts  were  the  older  forms 
of  transferring  property.  Here  a thousand  years’  work  in 
civilization  has  developed,  in  connection  with  the  progress 
of  refined  conceptions  of  justice,  the  institutions  of  law, 
which  to-day  govern  and  bind  all  intercourse  as  a matter  of 
course. 

The  leading  conceptions  in  this  work  of  civilization  in  the 
past  and  present  do  naturally  not  relate  to  the  whole  society 
and  all  its  purposes,  nor  to  all  qualities  of  men.  In  every 
ordinary  barter  two  persons,  whose  other  qualities  are  not 
concerned  in  this  relation,  which  is  confined  to  this  one  barter, 
meet  with  the  purpose  of  advancing  their  mutual  interests 
by  the  exchange  of  certain  goods.  This  result  is  reached  if 
they  exchange  values  essentially  equal,  if  both  sides  make 
equal  profits.  “ The  giving  and  the  taking,”  Herbart  says, 
“ every where  presupposes  compensation,  i.e.}  equality  of 
the  given  and  the  taken.”  Concerning  the  standards  of 
equality  only,  can  there  be  any  dissent.  The  savage  sees 
equality  in  purely  external  circumstances,  in  the  fact  that 
the  furs  just  fill  the  kettle  for  which  he  trades  them.  The 
civilized  man  asks  for  equality  of  money  value,  the  formalist 
for  the  equal  absence  of  fraud,  force  and  error.  The  principle 

[729] 


34  Annals  oe  the  American  Academy. 

however,  always  remains  the  same.  Equality  measured 
in  some  way  is  required.  And  if  the  equality  of  both  sides 
required  by  the  conventional  standard  exists,  justice  is  secured 
because  the  logical  judgment  and  the  moral  test  does  not 
bring  the  single  agreement  into  relation  with  the  total  dis- 
tribution of  incomes,  with  the  total  worthiness  of  the  persons. 
Only  a fool  could  require  as  a demand  of  justice,  that  the 
grocer  grade  the  price  of  a pound  of  coffee  according  to  the 
wealth  of  each  customer,  or  that  in  a publishing  contract  the 
publisher  should  pay  to  the  author  of  an  unsalable  scientific 
book  a large  sum  because  it  is  a work  of  great  labor  and 
skill.  The  justice  of  a single  bargain  is  the  so-called 
exchanging  justice,  as  Trendelenburg  in  his  admirable  essays 
on  Aristotle  has  proved  to  be  the  real  meaning  of  the  great 
Stagaryte.  This  exchanging  justice  is  nevertheless  not  in 
strict  contrast  to  distributive  justice;  it  is  only  one  of  its 
subdivisions,  which  concerns  not  the  whole  society  and  all  its 
purposes,  but  simply  a part  of  them  and  an  especial  purpose. 

As  long  as  the  value  of  every  good  thing  is  a different  one 
for  each  man,  so  long  a certain  inequality  of  profits  will  not 
seem  unjust.  Only  when  this  equality  oversteps  certain 
bounds,  when  its  cause  is  not  the  free  decision  of  a free  man, 
does  a lively  feeling  of  injustice  arise  and  seek  a legal 
remedy.  For  thousands  of  years  the  selfish  impulses  of 
those  who  in  the  social  struggle  of  competition  are  the 
stronger,  have  demanded  unconditional  freedom  of  contract; 
and  this  demand  is  always  opposed  by  public  conscience 
and  the  demand  of  the  weaker,  which  establishes  the  con- 
ception of  justum  pretium,  which  requires  a governmental 
regulation  of  prices,  statutes  on  usury,  consideration  for  the 
‘ ‘ Icesio  enormis ,”  public  control  of  abuses  in  trade  and 
traffic,  a restriction  of  exploitation.  This  requirement  dis- 
appears only  when  two  real  equals  meet,  who  as  a rule 
derive  equal  benefit  from  their  commercial  relations. 

The  older  economic  school  of  Adam  Smith,  as  we  sug- 
gested in  our  introduction,  had  found  its  ideal  of  justice 


Justice  in  Pouticau  Economy. 


35 


exclusively  in  the  freedom  of  contracts.  Presuming  that  all 
men  are  by  nature  equal,  it  demanded  only  freedom  for  these 
equal  men,  in  the  hope  that  this  would  result  in  agreements 
about  equal  values  with  equal  profits  for  both  parties.  It 
knew  neither  the  social  classes  nor  the  social  institutions  in 
their  significance  for  economic  life;  for  it  the  social  mechan- 
ism was  composed  exclusively  of  the  activity  of  individuals 
and  their  single  agreements.  And  therefore  it  could  not 
demand  any  other  kind  of  justice.  This  was  not  wrong, 
but  it  was  only  a part  of  the  “ just  ” which  it  demanded. 

We  demand  to-day  above  all,  besides  a just  system  of  bar- 
ter, just  economic  institutions,  i.  e .,  we  demand  that  the 
complexes  of  rules  of  morals  and  right  which  govern  groups 
of  men  who  live  and  work  together  should  harmonize  in 
their  results  with  those  ideal  conceptions  of  justice  which 
on  the  basis  of  our  moral  and  religious  conceptions  are  pre- 
valent to-day,  or  which  are  gaining  recognition.  We  do  not 
acknowledge  any  one  of  these  institutions  to  be  above  his- 
tory, as  having  always  existed  or  as  necessarily  everlasting. 
We  test  the  result  of  every  one  of  them,  and  ask  of  each: 
How  did  it  originate,  what  conceptions  of  justice  have  gen- 
erated it,  what  necessity  exists  for  it  to-day  ? 

To  be  sure  we  also  know  how  to  appreciate  the  value  of 
the  institutions  transmitted  to  us,  we  know  that  the  sacred 
traditions  of  the  past  fill  our  mind  with  awe,  that  even  the 
form  of  traditional  law  has  a restraining  effect  on  rough 
characters,  that  a lasting  condition  of  social  peace  is  based 
on  the  greatest  possible  restriction  of  formal  breach  of  law. 
We  admit  that  institutions  must  never  disappear  in  form 
and  substance,  that  nations  can  never  create  anything  wholly 
new,  but  must  always  build  on  what  exists.  In  this  lasting 
continuity  of  the  whole  we  have  a guarantee  that  the 
struggle  for  that  which  is  good  and  just  will  not  expire 
fruitlessly;  though  this  would  always  happen,  if  each  gen- 
eration had  to  begin  this  struggle  anew,  and  was  not  fur- 
nished with  the  inheritance  of  tried  wisdom  and  justice, 


2,6  Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

contained  in  traditional  institutions.  We  admit  that  every 
momentary  condition  of  peace  in  society,  as  it  is  preserved 
by  an  existing  law  of  property,  inheritance  and  some  other 
institutions,  is  more  valuable  than  a dangerously  unsettling 
war  for  a juster  law  of  property  and  inheritance,  when  the 
traditional  law  still  corresponds  to  the  equilibrium  of  the 
forces  existing  in  society  and  to  the  prevalent  ideal  concep- 
tions. In  this  case  every  struggle  for  more  just  laws  is  for 
the  time  being  hopeless  and  vain.  It  can  only  harm  and 
destroy.  Even  the  most  violent  revolution  can  not  replace 
the  mental  transformation  of  men  which  is  the  precondition 
of  a juster  law.  The  essential  point  is  always  that  the  forces 
themselves  and  the  conceptions  of  justice  have  changed. 
Then  only  can  a struggle  succeed. 

Because  this  will  always  be,  we  do  not  fear,  like  the  alarm- 
ists and  the  pusillanimous  of  all  times,  every  struggle  for 
juster  laws.  And  on  this  account  we  do  not  see  in  every 
manifestation  of  the  self-esteem  of  the  lower  classes  a simply 
outrageous  revolt  against  the  doctrine  of  the  natural  aristo- 
cratic organization  of  society.  Much  less  should  we  fall 
into  the  mistake  of  all  aged  reformers  who,  because  they 
have  achieved  something,  believe  that  the  world’s  history 
should  close  with  them  and  what  they  have  accomplished. 
We  know  to-day  that  history  never  stands  still,  that  all 
progress  of  history  is  gained  only  in  the  struggle  of  peoples 
and  of  social  classes,  and  that  they  cannot  always  be  as 
peaceful  as  in  a nursery.  And  those  who  are  always  ready 
to  dream  of  a jolly  war  and  its  favorable  moral  consequences 
should  not  forget  that  the  social  struggles  within  society 
differ  from  wars  between  nations  only  in  degree,  not  in  kind. 
Social  struggles  can  likewise  favorably  affect  peoples.  I only 
call  attention  to  the  struggles  between  the  plebeians  and  the 
patricians.  There  can  be  no  progress  in  institutions  without 
certain  social  struggles.  All  struggles  within  society  are 
struggles  for  institutions,  and  that  for  the  progress  of  culti- 
vation the  individual  will  grow  enthusiastic,  will  even  sacrifice 

[732] 


Justice:  in  Pouiticau  Economy. 


37 


his  life  for  that  for  which  classes  and  parties  fight,  is  so 
inevitable,  so  salutary  that  now  and  then  we  do  not  find 
fault  with  breaking  the  formal  law  in  such  contests. 

There  is  no  worse  delusion  than  that  of  the  older  English 
economists  that  there  are  a number  of  simple  and  natural 
legal  and  economic  institutions  which  have  always  been  as 
they  are  and  will  always  remain  so;  that  all  progress  of  civ- 
ilization and  wealth  is  simply  an  individual  or  technical  one; 
that  this  is  simply  a question  of  increased  production  or 
consumption  which  will  and  can  be  accomplished  on  the  basis 
of  the  same  legal  institutions.  This  faith  in  the  stability 
of  economic  institutions  was  the  result  of  the  naive  over- 
weening confidence  of  the  older  economists  in  the  omnipo- 
tence of  the  individual  and  of  the  individual  life.  Socialism 
then  has  perhaps  over-estimated  the  significance  of  social 
institutions.  Historical  economics  and  the  modern  phi- 
losophy of  law  have  given  them  their  due  position  by  show- 
ing us  that  the  great  epochs  of  economic  progress  are  pri- 
marily connected  with  the  reform  of  social  institutions. 
The  great  messages  of  salvation  to  humanity  were  all  aimed 
at  the  injustice  of  outworn  institutions;  by  higher  justice 
and  better  institutions  humanity  is  educated  up  to  higher 
forms  of  life. 

As  little  as  the  social  institutions  of  antiquity  have  gov- 
erned modern  history,  as  certainly  as  slavery  and  serfdom 
have  vanished,  as  certainly  as  all  past  progress  of  institu- 
tions was  connected  with  apparent  success  in  distributing 
wealth  and  incomes  in  a more  just  way  and  in  adapting  it 
more  and  more  to  personal  virtues  and  accomplishments,  as 
certainly  as  this  increased  more  and  more  the  activity  of  all 
individuals,  as  certain  as  all  this  is  it,  that  the  future  will 
also  see  new  improvements  in  this  direction,  that  the  insti- 
tutions of  coming  centuries  will  be  more  just  than  those  of 
to-day.  The  decisive  ideal  conceptions  will  be  influenced 
not  exclusively  but  essentially  by  distributive  justice.  Insti- 
tutions which  govern  whole  groups  of  human  beings  and 

[733] 


38  Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

the  entire  distribution  of  wealth  and  incomes  necessarily 
call  forth  a judgment  upon  their  total  effects.  Inasmuch, 
indeed,  as  single  institutions  concern  only  single  men  and 
single  phases  of  life,  the  justice  required  will  only  be  a par- 
tial one.  Naturally  this  is  always  easy  to  attain.  A just 
assessment  of  taxes,  a just  distribution  of  the  burdens  for 
the  improvement  of  highways,  of  the  duty  of  military  ser- 
vice, a just  gradation  of  wages  are  much  easier  to  attain 
than  a just  distribution  of  the  total  incomes  and  wealth. 
But  an  endeavor  towards  these  ends  will  never  cease;  all 
partially  just  regulations  have  significance  only  in  a system 
of  the  just  distribution  of  the  total.  And  with  this  we 
finally  come  to  the  question  what  can  be  and  what  should 
the  State  do  in  this  matter? 

In  our  view  it  will  obviously  not  be  a body  confined  to 
the  extension  of  justice  in  criminal  law,  in  the  jurisdiction 
upon  contracts  and  further,  perhaps,  in  the  assessment  of 
taxes,  but  ignoring  the  just  distribution  of  goods.  What 
sense  is  there  in  warming  up  in  the  legislatures  over  the 
hundredth  part  of  a cent,  which  a quart  of  beer  or  a yard  of 
cloth  is  raised  in  price  for  the  poor  man,  when  one  takes  the 
standpoint  on  principle,  that  his  wages  are  to  be  regarded 
as  something  indifferent  and  remote  from  all  human  inter- 
vention. Our  modem  civilized  commonwealth  indeed  cannot 
remove  every  injustice,  because  primarily  it  operates  and  has 
to  operate  by  means  of  law.  But  it  should  not  therefore  be 
indifferent  to  the  moral  sentiments  of  men  who  ask  for  justice 
in  distributing  wealth  and  incomes  for  the  grand  total  of 
human  society.  The  State  is  the  centre  and  the  heart  in 
which  all  institutions  empty  and  unite.  It  also  has  a strong 
direct  influence  on  the  distribution  of  incomes  and  wealth  as 
the  greatest  employer  of  labor,  the  greatest  property  holder, 
or  the  administrator  of  the  greatest  undertakings.  Above  all 
it  exercises  as  legislator  and  administrator  the  greatest 
indirect  influence  on  law  and  custom,  on  all  social  institutions; 
and  this  is  the  decisive  point. 

[734] 


Justice  in  Pouticau  Economy.  39 

The  right  man  in  the  right  place,  the  great  statesman  and 
reformer,  the  far-seeing  party  chief  and  legislator  can  here 
accomplish  extraordinary  things,  not  directly,  not  immedi- 
ately, but  through  a wise  and  just  transformation  of  the 
economic  institutions  they  can  greatly  influence  the  admin- 
istration of  incomes  and  property.  Of  course,  the  theory 
which  sees  only  natural  processes  in  all  economic  life  admits 
this  as  little  as  those  who  from  the  standpoint  of  certain  class 
interests,  from  conviction  of  principle,  or  even  from  mere 
shortsightedness  constantly  recur  to  the  impotency  of  the 
State.  Statesmen  of  a lower  order  also  talk  with  eunuchs’ 
voices  of  the  inability  of  the  State  to  interfere  anywhere; 
they  mistake  their  own  impotency  for  that  of  the  State.  All 
these  adverse  opinions  forget  that  the  State  is  and  must  be 
the  leading  intelligence,  the  responsible  centre  of  public 
sentiment,  the  acme  of  existing  moral  and  intellectual 
powers,  and  therefore  can  attain  great  results  in  this  direction. 

We  do  not  demand  that  any  leading  personalities,  like  a 
human  omnipotence,  should  control,  compare,  examine 
and  estimate  the  qualities  and  achievements  of  millions, 
and  accordingly  distribute  incomes  justly.  This  is  a con- 
ception of  folly  which  reasonable  socialists  now  abandon. 
The  State  can  at  all  times  chiefly  influence  a juster  distribu- 
tion of  income  by  means  of  improved  social  institutions. 
Only  in  this  way  is  it  guaranteed  against  having  its  best 
intentions  destroyed  by  . a thousandfold  formal  injustice. 
The  total  of  economic  institutions  will  always  be  more  im- 
portant than  the  insight  and  intention  of  those  who  for  the 
time  being  govern  in  the  central  administration,  be  they  the 
greatest  of  men.  Their  wisdom  and  justice  can  promote 
and  reform  the  institutions,  but  cannot  take  their  place. 
They  will  prove  themselves  true  benefactors  of  humanity 
only  by  fixing  the  net  result  of  their  labors  in  lasting  insti- 
tutions, in  increasing  for  posterity  the  great  capital  of 
traditional  justice  by  reforms;  and  this  will  secure  immor- 
tality to  their  genius  and  their  will. 

[735] 


40  Annaes  of  the  American  Academy. 

We  are  at  the  end  of  our  inquiry.  What  is  the  result  ? It 
is  the  fact  that  the  conception  of  justice  grows  out  of  neces- 
sary processes  in  our  soul  and  necessarily  influences  economic 
life.  The  idea  of  justice  is,  like  other  moral  ideas,  not  im- 
parted to  men  by  some  revelation,  and  just  as  little  is  it  an 
arbitrary  invention;  it  is  the  necessary  product  of  our  moral 
intuition  and  our  logical  thinking,  and  in  so  far  it  is  an 
eternal  truth,  manifesting  itself  ever  new  yet  ever  similar 
metamorphoses.  In  many  it  works  only  as  a vague  feeling. 
In  the  course  of  history  it  develops,  for  the  majority,  into 
clear  conceptions,  standards  and  conclusions.  According  to 
the  laws  of  his  thought  man  must  unify  the  manifold  and 
then  subject  it  to  uniform  standards.  The  supposition  of 
moral  communities  in  society  creates  the  conception  of  an 
earthly  justice;  the  supposition  of  the  unity  of  all  things, 
that  of  divine  justice.  It  is  the  same  chain  of  judgments 
and  conclusions  which,  dissatisfied  with  the  imperfections  of 
earthly  things,  transfers  the  last  compensation  into  a higher 
and  better  world.  The  idea  of  justice  is  thus  connected  with 
the  highest  and  best  that  we  think,  imagine  and  believe. 

But  as  this  highest  and  last  never  reveals  itself  to  mankind 
in  its  full  splendor,  as  we  eternally  seek  it,  eternally  battle 
for  it,  and  though  ever  progressing,  never  reach  it,  so  the 
idea  of  justice  has  no  resting,  determined  existence  on  earth. 
As  no  penal  law,  no  judge  is  absolutely  just,  so  no  estab- 
lished distribution  of  property  and  incomes  is  altogether  just. 
But  every  consecutive  epoch  of  mankind  has  won  a higher 
measure  of  justice  in  this  field.  In  custom,  law  and  existing 
institutions  which  rule  economic  life  we  have  the  outcome 
of  all  the  struggles  for  justice  which  history  has  seen  for 
many  thousand  years. 

The  value  of  our  own  life,  of  our  own  time,  does  not  lie 
so  much  in  what  was  attained  before  us,  as  in  the  amount 
of  strength  and  moral  energy  with  which  we  press  forward 
in  the  path  of  progress.  Great  civilized  nations,  great  epochs 
and  great  men  are  not  those  who  comfortably  enjoy  their 

[736] 


Justice  in  Political  Economy. 


4i 


ancestral  inheritances,  who  eat,  drink  and  increase  produc- 
tion, but  those  who  with  greater  energy  than  others  devote 
their  services  to  the  great  moral  ideas  of  humanity ; they  are 
those  who  succeed  in  propagating  moral  ideas  and  in  intro- 
ducing them  more  deeply  than  hitherto  into  the  sphere  of 
egoistic  struggles  for  existence;  they  are  those  who  on  the 
field  of  economics  succeed  in  securing  and  carrying  through 
juster  institutions. 

Gustav  Schmoller. 

Berlin. 

[Translated  by  Ernst  I,,  von  Halle  and  Carl  L.  Schurz.] 


The  following  papers,  which  are  of  interest  to 

Students  of  the  New  Political  Economy 

have  appeared  in  the  Annans  and  been  reprinted  in 

SEPARATE  EDITIONS  : 

LAW  OF  WAGES  AND  INTEREST.  By  Prof.  J.  B.  CEARK, 
of  Smith  College.  Price,  35  cents. 

PROVINCE  OF  SOCIOLOGY.  By  Prof.  F.  H.  GiddinOS,  of 
Bryn  Mawr.  Price,  25  cents. 

HISTORICAL  vs.  DEDUCTIVE  POLITICAL  ECONOMY.  By 
Prof.  Dr.  E.  von  Bofhm-Bawfrk,  of  Vienna.  Price,  25  cents. 
THE  AUSTRIAN  ECONOMISTS.  By  Prof.  Boehm-Bawerk. 

Price,  25  cents. 

THEORY  OF  VALUE.  By  Prof.  Dr.  F.  VON  WiESER,  of  Prague, 
Austria.  Price,  25  cents. 

PATTEN’S  DYNAMIC  ECONOMICS.  By  Prof.  J.  B.  Ceark. 

Price,  15  cents. 

GEOMETRICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  DETERMINATION  OF 
PRICES.  By  Prof.  L£on  Waeras,  of  Lausanne,  Switzerland. 

Price,  25  cents. 

EFFECTS  OF  THE  CONSUMPTION  OF  WEALTH  ON  DIS- 
TRIBUTION. By  Prof.  Wm.  Smart,  of  Glasgow,  Scotland. 

Price,  35  cents. 

STANDARD  OF  DEFERRED  PAYMENTS.  By  PROF.  E.  A. 

ROSS,  of  Stanford  University.  Price,  15  cents. 

COST  AND  UTILITY.  By  Prof.  S.  N.  PaTTEN,  of  the  University 
of  Pennsylvania.  Price,  25  cents. 

THEORY  OF  FINAL  UTILITY  IN  RELATION  TO  THE 
STANDARD  OF  DEFERRED  PAYMENTS.  By  Dr.  L.  S. 
Merriam,  of  Cornell.  Price,  25  cents. 

THE  SURPLUS  GAINS  OF  LABOR.  By  PROF.  J.  B.  Ceark. 

Price,  15  cents. 

COST  AND  EXPENSE.  By  Prof.  S.  N.  PATTEN.  Price,  25  cents. 
INTEREST  AND  PROFITS.  By  Prof.  A.  T.  Hadeey,  of  Yale. 

Price,  15  cents. 

AUSTRIAN  THEORY  OF  VALUE.  By  Prof.  S.  M.  Macvane, 
of  Harvard.  Price,  25  cents. 

SUBJECTIVE  AND  OBJECTIVE  VIEW  OF  DISTRIBUTION. 

By  Prof.  John  Hobson,  of  London.  Price,  25  cents. 

TOTAL  UTILITY  STANDARD  OF  DEFERRED  PAYMENTS. 
By  Prof.  E.  A.  Ross.  Price,  25  cents. 


American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 

Station  B,  Philadelphia. 


History,  Theory  and  Technique  of  Statistics, 

BY 

PROFESSOR  AUGUST  MEITZEN, 

UNIVERSITY  OF  BERLIN. 


TRANSLATED  INTO  ENGLISH 

BY 

PROFESSOR  ROLAND  P.  FALKNER, 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


“The  work  covers  systematically  the  whole  field  of  statistical 
theory.”  Review  of  Reviews. 

“There  are  few  valuable  works  on  statistics  in  the  English  lan- 
guage, and  the  appearance  of  a work  so  scholarly  and  comprehensive 
as  Dr.  Meitzen’s  will  be  hailed  with  delight  not  only  by  students  of 
economics  and  political  science,  but  by  all  who  are  interested  in  the 
science  of  conveying  truth  by  means  of  figures.”  National  Baptist. 

“The  work  has  been  ably  translated  and  gives  a statement  of  the 
best  scientific  thought  of  Germany.”  Publishers'  Weekly. 

“This  work  has  received  the  warmest  commendation  from  men 
of  science.  The  Director  of  the  Statistical  Office  of  the  German 
Empire  marks  it  with  his  approval,  declaring  it  to  mark  a decided  ad- 
vance in  statistical  theory.”  Springfield,  Mass.,  Republican. 

“It  will  be  welcomed  with  interest  by  all  students  of  economic 
science.”  New  York  Evangelist. 


243  Pages,  Cloth,  $1.50. 

SENT  POSTPAID  ON  RECEIPT  OF  PRICE. 


American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 


STATION  B,  PHILADELPHIA. 


Important  Announcement ! 


The  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science 
has  just  published  a translation  from  the  German  of  Pro- 
fessor Gustav  Cohn’s 

“History  of  Political  Economy.” 

This  is  the  first  account  in  English  of  the  history  of  political 
economy  from  a German  point  of  view,  and  all  persons  interested  in 
economics  will  be  glad  of  an  opportunity  to  learn  at  first  hand  of 
what  a German  thinks  the  Germans  have  done  for  this  science.  Pro- 
fessor Cohn  is  one  of  the  most  pleasing  of  German  writers  on 
this  subject,  and  is  well  known  as  a most  vigorous  thinker  and 
profound  scholar.  He  is  well  acquainted  with  the  literature  of 
economics  in  other  languages,  and  has  had  unusual  opportunities  for 
study  and  investigation  of  practical  matters  in  the  leading  countries 
of  Europe. 

The  following  is  a list  of  the  chapters  : 

Economic  History  and  the  History  of  Economic  Science, 

The  Antecedents  of  Economic  Science, 

The  Physiocrats, 

Adam  Smith, 

The  Eollowers  of  Adam  Smith, 

German  Political  Economy  in  the  first  half  of  the  XIX  Century, 

Socialistic  Literature, 

The  New  German  Political  Economy. 

The  work  has  been  translated  by  Dr.  Jos.  A.  Hill,  and 
is  prefaced  by  an  introductory  note  by  Prof.  Edmund  J. 
James,  Ph.  D. 

142  Pages,  octavo,  - Price,  $1.00. 

American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 


Station  B,  Philadelphia,  U.  S.  A. 


